The important characteristic of international competition between firms from developed (DC) and less developed countries (LDC) is vertical product differentiation. We consider a model of price competition between DC and LDC firms on the LDC market with sequential quality choice and the possibility of imitation. In this setup, we study the effects of trade policy in the form of ex-post tariff (that is, tariffs that are set after the choice of firms' qualities). The government in this case faces a choice between commitment to free trade and imposing a tariff. The peculiar feature of trade policy here is that it can lead to change in the equilibrium rank of qualities of the two firms compared to the rank of qualities in free trade. So we identify conditions under which this so-called quality reversal can take place.
Introduction
Business these days is ". . . all about competition with everyone from everywhere for everything," as was noted some time ago in The Economist (2008) . One of the remarkable features of this global phenomenon is a growing number of companies from emerging markets taking part in this process. Moreover, emerging markets themselves are rapidly becoming ever more important scenes of global competitive battles between domestic companies and firms from the developed world (The Economist 2008) . A distinctive aspect of an emerging market is that a significant portion of consumers from this part of the world ". . . often demand products at far lower price and often in more basic form or smaller size than their developed countries counterparts." (The Economist 2008). Translating the above features into the jargon of industrial economics and international trade, there is vertical product differentiation on the demand side of the market while the supply side is characterized with intra-industry trade and imperfect competition between the firms from developed countries (DC) and firms from emerging markets or less developed countries (LDC). In fact, trade in vertically differentiated product seems to be the prevailing pattern of trade between DC and LDC nowadays.
1 In particular, one would expect that typically DC firms produce product varieties of higher qualities whereas the LDC firms produce varieties of lower qualities.
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Another important feature or stylized fact of such competition is that companies from the DC mostly act as quality leaders when competing with their LDC counterparts even on the LDC market. The rationale for this is that the DC firms are (i) in general more technologically advanced than their LDC counterparts; and (ii) in particular, the firms that engage in international trade tend to be more efficient than the firms that operate only at home.
3 Thus, we can safely assume that the DC firm assumes the role of a technological leader on both counts. As we will see, this technological leadership transforms in general into quality leadership so that the DC firm serves the upper tail of the market and it enables it to gain larger market share, charge higher price and earn larger profits than its LDC counterpart. Last but not the least, it is well-known that the firms from the emerging markets rely on imitation and other forms of acquiring indispensable (tacit and other) knowledge (often called technological spillovers) when competing with the market leaders from the developed countries. Related to this, there is plenty of evidence that imports in emerging market countries from the developed world serve a significant channel of technology diffusion via technological spillovers (see Sutton and Kellow 2010; Acharya and Keller 2009; and Keller 2004, 2009 for an extensive review of this literature). More specifically, the prior presence of the DC firm in the LDC market served as the key source of knowledge spillovers that were generated and accumulated via trade (import). These knowledge spillovers might in turn have been essential for the creation of the domestic LDC firm. An examination of the (typically mid-sized) LDC firms' histories shows that the origin of these trade-related spillovers (or firms' capabilities in the language of Sutton and Kellow 2010) in many cases comes from prior trading experience. For instance, Sutton and Kellow (2010) documented that the biggest group of the large Ethiopian manufacturing firms had their origin in trading companies which in the past imported the goods that they now started to produce. Moreover, the presence of technological spillovers could be traced back to an already long presence of multinational companies in the LDC markets not only through their export to LDC but also through FDI (outsourcing activities, importing of inputs from DC, foreign acquisitions of firms from the LDC, etc). Finally, an important channel of technological spillovers stems from on-the-job training of the pioneering LDC firm's workers by a foreign firm or agent as documented by Rhee and Belot (1990) , who studied ten successfully developed industries in eleven LDC. Similarly, Mostafa and Klepper (2011) provide theoretical and empirical analysis of the development of one of the above mentioned industries -the Bangladesh garment industry (see also Morita and Nguyen 2011 for a description of the role of quality-enhancing technology spillovers in the evolution of the Bangladesh garment industry). Thus, technological spillovers seems to be an outcome of a deliberate commitment to learning and matching international performance standards through ongoing interaction with foreigners (see Keller 2004 ).
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It is important to stress that we consider technological spillovers to be exogenously determined as a byproduct of all these globalization processes. However, there exists by now already extensive literature that endogenizes imitation or technological spillovers by associating them with the Southern IPR regime or with on-the-job training at the foreign firm or agent. 5, 6 Moreover, several authors related the presence of spillovers and imitation with the presence of FDI on the LDC markets. 7 With the exception of Morita and Nguyen (2011) , all of the above articles do not analyze vertically differentiated markets.
4 As Keller (2009) noted, technology transfer via technological spillovers is likely to exceed the regular transfer via licensing (see also McNeil and Fraumeni 2005) . See also Keller (2004 Keller ( , 2009 ) for a detailed description of the channels of the technology diffusion process.
5 See, for instance, Chin and Grossman (1990) , Diwan and Rodrik (1991) , Deardorff (1992) , Helpman (1993) , Žigić (1998, 2000) , Lai and Qiu (2003) , Kim and Lapan (2008) , Mostafa and Klepper (2011), and Jinji (2011) . 6 In fact, there is a tight connection between technology spillovers and IPR protection. The degree of IPR protection greatly affects a country's level of spillovers in the sense that loose implementation of IPR protection policies enhances the intensity of spillovers (see Jinji 2011) .
7 See, for instance, Glass and Saggi (1998 , Naghavi (2007) , and Morita and Nguyen (2011). However, despite the fact that the speed and power at which some emerging market firms catch up is very intense, as the above mentioned report by The Economist suggests, it is still an open question whether some current LDC firms could already be capable of becoming quality leaders and generating goods that consumers perceive superior to the ones produced by their DC competitors (if both goods were offered at the same price). On the other hand, there is a theoretical argument in the trade literature that within the considered setup of duopoly competition in vertically differentiated goods, trade policy leads to so-called quality reversal (see Herguera, Kujal, and Petrakis 2002) . That is, by means of trade policy (tariffs), the LDC firm opts for higher while DC firm chooses lower quality in equilibrium.
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A prominent example of tariffs being set with the intention of quality reversal comes from the Chinese electric vehicle industry where the government used import tariffs on U.S. cars to promote the domestic car industry. As stated by Klaus Paur, Director for Automotive Analysis at the market research agency Ipsos in China, "At the beginning the objective was, literally, to leapfrog." 9 The idea of quality reversal may be also in line with the commonly known East Asian "economic miracles" as it seems consistent with empirical observations of successful trade, industrial and other policies which promoted technological and economic growth. For instance, policy induced quality reversals, among other factors (see Beason and Weinstein 1996 for alternative explanations), might also have contributed to Japan's economic success before and after World War II. At that time, Japan was a less developed country with its firms mostly imitating western products. In the Japanese photographic industry (where "1931 marks the start of Japan's first camera boom, encouraged by government-sponsored programs" 10 ), the growth started by imitating German products in the early 1930s. For example, Goro Yoshida, the founder of Canon, ". . . disassembled a Leica camera in an attempt to develop a high-grade 35mm focal-plane-shutter rangefinder camera." 11 Also some time later, in the 1950s, after imposing trade policies in order to restrict imports and promote exports, and encouraging imitation (or reverse engineering; see Rodrik 2001) , many of Japan's industries (including the photographic industry) have evolved into the world's technological and quality leaders. Similar stories can be told about the development of the South Korean electronic industry. For instance, Samsung's new generation TV sets are definitely top quality products on an extremely competitive TV market. As recently noted on the stuff.tv website, there is a rumor that Samsung is now ". . . planning to release 0mm bezel TVs in late 2012 or 2013 to keep hold of its TV throne, currently being kept warm by the (8mm bezel) Stuff Gadget Award winning Samsung D8000." 12 So there is no wonder that the current trade literature has already started to explore the effects of trade policy in the above described markets as well as the possibilities of quality reversal (see the Section 1.1). Interestingly enough, a couple of recent empirical studies also examine the link between tariffs and quality upgrades (e.g., Bustos 2011) but these studies presume that there is an already developed export sector and then investigate what would be the impact of tariff removal on the quality of exported goods. For instance, Verhoogen (2008) shows that initially larger and more LDC productive firms are likely to increase exports and display quality upgrades in the face of trade liberalization with their DC trading partners (see also Bustos 2011 for similar findings). We, on the other hand, focus on the reverse direction, and we study how the imposition of tariffs by LDC (and presence of spillovers) affects the entry and quality choice of the domestic firm. In this light, the recent revival and reassessment of the idea of import substitution policy represents an additional motivation to look at the policy effects of strategic tariffs. Thus, for instance, Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) show that the countries that initially follow a trade protection policy and other import substitution policies display respectable economic growth per capita for a substantial period of time. They also demonstrate that bad macro management and adverse external shocks, and not trade policies, are the main drivers of economic crises in developing countries.
One of the aims of our paper is to model and to study the positive and normative aspects of the part of the above described competition between the DC and LDC firms that takes place on the LDC market. The reason that we focus on that side of market interaction is that the possibility of quality reversal can only occur in this setup and we wish to revisit this issue. Needless to mention, given the intra-industry character of the trade between the DC and LDC, the DC side of the market interaction of the LDC and DC firms is also worth studying. For instance, it could be shown that LDC firms' efficiency and quality levels have to be above a particular threshold for them to be capable of competing on the DC or international market (see, for instance, Mostafa and Klepper 2011 and Sutton 2007) .
As for our modeling approach, unlike in previous literature, we explicitly address the two above described features of the competition between the DC and LDC firms in vertically differentiated products: (i) quality leadership by the DC firm 13 and; (ii)
12 Source: www.stuff.tv/news/tv-and-hi-fi/rumour-mill/samsung-set-to-launch-ultra-thinzero-bezel-tvs-in-2012.
13 The sequential choice of qualities has already been studied in the traditional industrial organization literature (Aoki and Prusa 1997; Lehmann-Grube 1997; Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube 2001) . By addressing leadership, our paper also complements the emerging literature on market leaders (Etro 2006 and Kováč, Vinogradov, andŽigić 2010 . In particular, Etro (2011) applies the concept of leadership and endogenous entry to the field of strategic trade policy.
technological spillovers or/and imitation stemming from the leader to the follower. We use the standard assumptions that each firm makes a sunk cost investment (e.g., in R&D or technological improvements) in order to achieve a certain quality level. As Shaked and Sutton (1987, p. 136) suggest, in the case of vertical product differentiation this assumption is ". . . more likely to be valid in those industries in which the main burden of product improvement falls on fixed costs, rather than on variable costs." Finally, we assume that the DC firm has a higher R&D efficiency at the margin, reflecting its lower opportunity costs due to, say, a higher level of human capital. This consequently implies that lower investments are needed in order to achieve a certain quality level.
Another key aim of our paper is to make an explicit comparison of the domestic welfare under free trade with the domestic welfare resulting from a trade policy under considerations and discuss the policy implications of it. More specifically, we consider a simple trade policy in a form of an ex-post tariff. Imposing import tariffs seems to be the most common and the most practical form of trade policies in LDCs.
14 We assume that the level of the tariff is chosen (in the third stage) after both the leader's investment in quality (first stage) and the domestic firm's imitation decision (second stage), but precedes firms' pricing decisions (fourth stage).
Note that in such a setup the LDC government faces a choice between commitment to free trade and setting a (time consistent) tariff after observed quality choices. Such choice, however, would not be an issue if the LDC government can commit to ex-ante tariffs (that is, tariffs set before firms' choice of quality) since then, as it is well known, positive tariffs always maximize social welfare (even though the government has an option to set tariffs to zero and commit to free trade; see, for example, Brander 1995) .
We argue that the timing in which the government sets tariffs ex-post seems suitable in our context due to the fact that the LDC governments may lack commitment capability. Moreover, a trade policy is, by its nature, of second-best (or even third-best) character, and, consequently, it is plagued with the time consistency problem.
15 The above timing takes into account these phenomena, and the tariff that we calculate below is, in fact, a subgame perfect (or time consistent) tariff.
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As for our findings, we identify conditions under which trade policy leads to quality reversal in equilibrium. Our results indicate that the optimal trade policy enhances the impact of imitation by the domestic follower and quality reversal becomes more likely when imitation is easier. More specifically, we show that quality reversal tends to occur only when the difference between the firms' technological levels (measured by marginal efficiencies of firms' investments in qualities) is "rather" small; this result, however, is amplified under the possibility of imitation and technological spillovers. In addition, when trade policy leads to quality reversal, and the degree of imitation is not large, it in general also improves the domestic country's social welfare vis-à-vis free trade. On the other hand, when trade policy does not induce quality reversal as an outcome, (and this is arguably empirically much a more relevant case), then free trade generally yields a larger domestic welfare. This raises an interesting commitment issue and provides a new rationale for the domestic government to commit to free trade. Such a commitment can be achieved, for instance, by a bilateral trade agreement or participation in a trade union.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief literature review, in Section 2, we introduce the model and the underlying assumptions. In Sections 3 and 4, we solve for price competition equilibrium and the optimal tariff. In Section 5, we analyze firms' quality choices. In Section 6, we compare the free trade and the trade policy equilibria and address the welfare effects. Section 7 concludes and discusses our results. A Supplementary Appendix available on Eugen Kovac's homepage 17 and from the authors upon request contains the proofs of all propositions as well as additional comparisons.
Related literature
Early studies of strategic trade policy focused on markets with either perfectly substitutable or horizontally differentiated products (see Brander 1995 for a survey). In recent years the attention of trade economists has been shifted towards vertically differentiated markets. More precisely, the idea of vertical differentiation capturing the different features in generating quality between DCs and LDCs has already been well established in the international trade literature (see Flam and Helpman 1987; Motta, Thisse, and Cabrales 1997) . However, until recently it has not been used to analyze the effects of trade policies. The recent papers that deal with the trade policy issues within the LDC-DC context differ in the market destination on which they focus. That, in turn, affects the choice of the policy instruments under considerations. Thus, the setup in which the competition takes place in one of the firm's home market naturally explores the role of import tariffs (see, for instance, Ghosh and Das 2001; Kúnin andŽigić 2004; MoragaGonzáles and Viaene 2005) , whereas in a third country market setup, the export subsidy seems the most natural trade policy instrument (see Zhou, Spencer, and Vertinsky 2002) . Our model belongs to the former group where the action takes place on the home market setup and tariffs are used as a policy instrument. Unlike the rest of the literature on strategic trade policy within the vertical differentiation model, we explicitly assume that (i) the DC firm's technological advantage puts it in the role of a technological leader, while (ii) the LDC firm then can benefit from spillovers or imitation in its choice of product quality. In what follows, we briefly review the papers that, like ours, focus on the home market and tariffs as policy instruments. Ghosh and Das (2001) seem to be among the first to consider strategic trade policy under vertical differentiation. However, they limit their analysis to exogenous qualities (i.e., there is no investments). The first who identify the phenomenon of quality reversal are Herguera, Kujal, and Petrakis (2002) , although they did not do in the LDC-DC context. They consider endogenous an choice of quality with the domestic and foreign firms being symmetric with respect to the technology. The authors analyze policy instruments in the form of ex-ante and ex-post tariffs, where the trade policy is chosen before and after firms' quality decisions, respectively. They show that by the virtue of ex-post tariffs, the domestic firm always produces the high-quality good implying that the setup in which the foreign firm produces a high-quality good in free trade is not anymore the equilibrium once an optimal (ex-post) tariff is applied. In addition, the optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive, resulting in a domestic monopoly whenever the domestic firm produces a lower quality.
Kúnin andŽigić (2004) also consider endogenous choices of qualities but introduce asymmetry between the DC and LDC firms due to different costs in generating quality. The qualities are again chosen simultaneously after the domestic country has specified its trade policies. Unlike the rest of the reviewed literature, Kúnin andŽigić (2004) focus on the case of a natural duopoly (following the terminology by Shaked and Sutton 1983) . In this case, the market is covered in equilibrium and cannot accommodate more than two firms. They analyze ex-post tariffs in a domestic market setup and also study the conditions under which the optimal trade policy leads to quality reversal. Moraga-Gonzáles and Viaene (2005) perform a similar analysis as Kúnin andŽigić (2004) , except that they do not consider a natural duopoly and they assume that the domestic government can somehow commit to its tariffs. That is, they consider only so-called ex-ante tariffs.
Finally, there are two recent papers that are related to our work that study the leaderfollower structure in quality choice in North-South trade and also allow for technological spillovers or imitation and IPR violation. Both of these papers appeared a few years after the working paper version of this paper was published (Kováč andŽigić 2007) . In the first paper by Acharyya and García-Alonso (2009) , the authors investigate a rather specific issue of the IPR (patent rights) in the North-South context and within the pharmaceutical sector where the possibility of parallel imports (or patent exhaustions) exists. Unlike our paper, they do not use trade policy nor do they allow for the possibility of quality reversal.
The second paper by Morita and Nguyen (2011) is in its focus closer to our paper since the authors, much like we do, tackle the positive and normative aspects of imitation in the North-South setup where competing products are vertically differentiated.
There are, however, several distinctions between those two approaches. First, Morita and Nguyen (2011) allow for both FDI and export as a mode of entry of the DC firm into the Southern market whereby technological spillovers occur only if the DC firm enters via FDI. We, on the other hand, focus on the trade between the DC and LDC firms and allow for technological spillovers from other source like import or on-the job training. As well known, the latter is rather well empirically documented (see Acharya and Keller 2009; Sutton and Kellow 2010; Mostafa and Klepper 2011) . Moreover, they consider technological spillovers to be the same thing as the strength of IPR, and therefore they investigate the issue of the optimal IPR from the Southern point of view. We, on the other hand, treat spillovers as an exogenous parameter. Second, as for consumers' taste for quality, they assume that there are only two types of consumers while we allow for a continuum of consumers. Third, Morita and Nguyen (2011) implicitly assume that the LDC government can commit to its tariffs while we calculate time consistent tariffs that are arguably more realistic given that LDC governments often lack commitment power (see, for instance, Bhattacharjea 1995; Karp and Perloff 1995) . Finally, since absence of government commitment may not always lead to socially more desirable policy outcome vis-à-vis free trade, we made an explicit comparison of the trade policy outcome with the outcome from free trade.
Model
We start with a theoretical model of international trade in vertically differentiated products, where firms from an LDC and DC country compete in both qualities and prices in the LDC domestic market. We consider two varieties of a good. One variety is produced by a foreign DC firm and the other by a domestic LDC firm. The foreign firm (Firm 1) is assumed to be a leader in quality and the domestic firm (Firm 2) a follower. We describe the whole situation as a four-stage game:
1. Firm 1 (the leader) decides whether to be active in the market and chooses its quality (by incurring fixed costs that are sunk later).
2. Firm 2 (the follower) decides whether to be active in the market and chooses its quality (by incurring fixed costs that are sunk later).
3. The domestic government decides on its trade policy in the form of an import tariff.
Firms 1 and 2 compete in prices.
The above timing may reflect the stylized fact that ". . . it is historically appropriate to consider a scenario where the home market is initially monopolized by a foreign firm, and a domestic firm enters if it expects to cover its entry costs under the strategic tariffs which would be rational for the government to impose after entry." (Bhattacharjea 1995, p. 291) . In this respect, the decision of Firm 1 whether to be (or to remain) active in the market may come in the face of new economic circumstances characterized by the announcement of trade policy and potential entry of the domestic competitor. Moreover, our policy instrument is an ex-post tariff, where the tariffs are imposed after the firms' quality choices have been observed. The very trade appears in the last, fourth stage that is captured by competition in prices while imitation or spillovers take place in the second stage in which the LDC firm chooses the quality and incurs sunk costs that are in generally lower due to knowledge spillovers. As already discussed in the introduction, the sources of these spillovers could be the prior presence and trade with the DC firm in the LDC market or the on-the job training of the LDC firm's workers at some foreign firm.
As for trade policy, we consider two regimes: a trade policy (TP) regime represented by import tariffs and a free trade (FT) regime. Actually, one can think about stage zero of the above game in which the LDC government decides which regime to choose. That is, whether to initiate a program of strategic trade policy or to commit itself to free trade. If the TP regime is chosen, there is usually a time lag between the announcement and the implementation of strategic trade policies.
18 As a consequence, the government may be forced to select the concrete level of its policy instrument only after the strategic choice of domestic firms has taken place. Even without an explicit announcement of the policy, the inability of the government to commit to the level of the policy instrument prior to the strategic decision of the firms would result in the same game structure and timing. On the other hand, in the FT regime, the domestic government does not behave strategically and takes no action in the third stage (corresponding to zero tariffs). Such behavior may be induced by bilateral agreements or the country's membership in a trade organization (see the welfare analysis in Section 6). In order to solve the model for the time consistent ex-post tariff and optimal quality levels, we look for the subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies and apply the standard backwards induction concept. We capture the difference between DC and LDC firms by an asymmetry in their cost structures and the sequential nature of their quality choices and investments. The costs incurred to achieve a certain quality level may be interpreted as R&D costs or investments into technology (or product design), which are sunk in later stages. Under the free trade regime, the sequential structure gives Firm 1 the first-mover advantage, when both firms have the same cost structure.
19 Moreover, the LDC firm may have cost disadvantages meaning that its opportunity cost to achieve a certain quality level may be higher than for the DC firm. The reason for postulating the differences in the quality cost efficiency stems from different abilities of the firms from the LDC (compared with DC) to elevate the quality levels of its products. Let s 1 denote the quality of Firm 1's product and s 2 the quality of Firm 2's product. We say that quality reversal occurs when the leader produces a higher quality in the free trade regime equilibrium (i.e., s 1 > s 2 ) whereas it produces a lower quality in the strategic trade policy regime equilibrium (i.e., s 2 > s 1 ).
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Assumptions of the model
We use the classical model of vertical differentiation with each consumer being characterized by a parameter θ and having the following utility function: The parameter θ can be interpreted as a consumer's appreciation of quality or taste for quality, meaning that the consumer is willing to pay θ for an increase in quality by one unit. We assume that θ is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1].
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Remark 1. More generally, one could consider the consumers uniformly distributed over [0, θ] , for example, in order to study the effect of changing the income level in the domestic country. Setting θ = 1 is without loss of generality and the model can easily be adjusted to incorporate the setting with an arbitrary θ (see Remark 3).
Based on the qualities (denoted s 1 and s 2 ) and prices (denoted p 1 and p 2 ) offered by Firms 1 and 2, the consumers choose between buying the product from Firm 1 or from Firm 2, or not buying at all.
22 This choice then determines the firms' demands D 1 and D 2 . We assume that the production is costless, but R&D yielding a particular product quality may involve certain fixed costs (incurred in stages 1 and 2 and sunk later). Therefore, the firms' gross profits are
where t is the tariff imposed on the foreign firm's imports. The value of t is chosen by the domestic government in stage 3. The gross profit (sometimes we will refer to it as just profit) does not take into account fixed costs. These are sunk and hence do not influence firms' behavior in the last stage. The profit obtained from the gross profit after subtracting the fixed costs will be referred to as the net profit.
As mentioned above, in the free trade (FT) regime, the domestic (LDC) government takes no action, so the corresponding import tariff is equal to zero. On the other hand, under the trade policy (TP) regime, the domestic government decides on its trade policy by setting the optimal level of the import tariff in order to maximize the domestic welfare. The domestic welfare (DW ) is defined as the sum of the consumer surplus (CS), income from tariffs net of subsidies T , and the domestic firm's net profit (Π 2 − C 2 , where C 2 are its fixed costs):
In stages 1 and 2, Firm 1 and Firm 2 choose their qualities in order to maximize their net profit. Firm 2's choice of quality in stage 2 is affected by technological spillovers that allow for imitation, which in turn lowers Firm 2's costs of obtaining a certain quality level. We assume that Firm 1 (leader) has a quadratic cost function of the form
where γ 1 > 0 is a positive parameter that reflects, for example, the efficiency of investments (like investments in R&D). A lower value of γ 1 means that investments are more efficient, in the sense that the costs of achieving a certain quality level are lower. Under the above cost function, Firm 1's marginal costs (with respect to quality) are γ 1 s 1 . On the other hand, Firm 2's cost function is more complex since it should reflect both the lower degree of the country's economic development and the possibility of imitation (due to technological spillovers). In particular, we impose the following conditions: (i) Without imitation, Firm 2's costs have the same form as Firm 1's costs, with a lower efficiency of investments.
(ii) Due to imitation, Firm 2's marginal costs decrease proportionally when it produces a lower quality good.
(iii) Imitation does not alter Firm 2's marginal costs when it produces a higher quality good (i.e., costs of quality improvement by an additional unit are unchanged).
(iv) Firm 2's cost function is continuous.
Under these conditions, Firm 2's cost function can be written as
with marginal costs equal to γ 2 (1 − µ)s 2 if s 2 ≤ s 1 and to γ 2 s 2 if s 2 > s 1 (see Supplementary Appendix B for details). The parameter γ 2 > 0 represents Firm 2's efficiency of investments and γ 2 ≥ γ 1 due to (i). The parameter µ ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of technological spillovers or the degree of imitation. In what follows, we will use these two terms interchangeably. The value 1 − µ is the proportion mentioned in (ii). We also denote α = γ 1 /γ 2 the relative efficiency of Firm 2 compared to Firm 1. By assumption α ∈ [0, 1]. Note that 1/α can serve as a measure of the technological gap between the DC and the LDC firm.
It is worthwhile to note that although Firm 2's cost function is continuous, its marginal costs are not. In particular, C 2 (s 1 , s 2 ) has a kink when s 2 = s 1 . When s 2 < s 1 , Firm 2 can be called an "imitator" as it benefits from lower marginal costs due to imitation. For higher quality levels, when s 2 > s 1 , Firm 2 becomes an "innovator" and has to incur the same marginal costs as Firm 1. However, its total costs are still affected by imitation and depend on Firm 1's quality via technological spillovers. A decrease in Firm 1's quality thus induces a negative externality on Firm 2, as it raises its costs of developing a superior product.
An increase in the degree of imitation µ makes imitation easier as it leads to lower costs of generating higher quality for Firm 2. In the extreme case µ = 0, there is no imitation. On the other hand, the case µ = 1 corresponds to full imitation, i.e., Firm 2 may replicate any quality s 2 ≤ s 1 with no costs. The value α = 1 (or γ 2 = γ 1 ) implies that (without imitation) the firms are symmetric as to their cost structures. On the other hand, values of α close to zero mean that Firm 1's production is almost costless compared to Firm 2, i.e., Firm 2 is completely inefficient compared to Firm 1.
Note that by assumption α and µ are exogenous parameters. In reality one could expect them to be correlated. More specifically, when the LDC's technological level is relatively low (small α), imitation may be impossible or more difficult, resulting in zero or small spillovers and vice versa. For instance, it could be postulated that the imitation or ability to absorb spillovers emerges only after a critical level of α 0 > 0 is reached and that the maximal spillovers could be achieved only at some even larger level of α 1 > α 0 . Technically, it would imply that the upper bound for µ is an increasing function of α on the interval [α 0 , α 1 ] with value 0 for α ≤ α 0 and reaching value 1 for α ≥ α 1 . Adding these considerations to our analysis would actually reduce the parameter space of α and µ. The results and causalities identified in the present paper, however, hold irrespective of some additional relation between these parameters. Finally, note that by not imposing any additional relation and constraints on α and µ, our model translates to a more general framework that is not constrained to LDC and DC firms' competition only.
Note also that the conditions (i)-(iv) can be easily adjusted when Firm 1's cost function has a different form. Of course, these conditions are not the only ones capturing the imitation. An important feature of our specification is that the follower's cost function is monotone in its quality s 2 and the marginal costs increase once s 2 surpasses s 1 . We conjecture that our results remain qualitatively true when other forms of costs functions satisfying these properties would be considered.
An alternative approach towards imitation within the vertical differentiation model is provided by Pepall (1997) who also considers a model with two firms: one being a leader in quality, the other a follower. In her approach, the leader chooses its quality (say s 1 ) by incurring a given, exogenously set level of fixed costs K, whereas the follower's fixed costs (of choosing quality s 2 ) are, due to imitation, only a fraction of K and have the form
2 . There are two important features of this cost structure which we consider not relevant in the international trade framework and in which our specification differs from Pepall (1997) . First, in her approach the leader's fixed costs are constant and do not depend on the chosen quality s 1 . Second, the follower's fixed costs are decreasing when s 2 < s 1 . As a consequence, the costs of achieving zero quality are paradoxically the largest (in that range). Pepall (1997, p. 267) interprets K as the costs incurred "to market a new product." In this sense the model may be appropriate to describe, for example, marketing ideas, where the follower's costs would be indeed close to zero when it copies, say, the same design. However, when quality is interpreted as reflecting the level of technology, we find Pepall's specification inappropriate. In such cases, higher costs may be needed to copy the same invention, but lower costs to make an inferior copy of the invention (e.g., older and slower microchips).
Price competition in the last stage
Proceeding backwards, we start with the price competition in the last stage.
In this respect, we analyze two cases depending on the ranking of qualities. First, we analyze the case where Firm 2 (the domestic LDC firm) produces a lower quality, i.e., s 1 > s 2 . When Firms 1 and 2 offer their products for prices p 1 and p 2 , they face the following demands:
denote the consumer who is indifferent between buying the good from Firms 1 and 2 and the consumer who is indifferent between buying the good from Firm 2 and not buying at all, respectively. The equilibrium in the last stage is given by a maximization of firms' profits (1). It can be easily computed that the equilibrium prices are
This yields the indifferent consumers and firms' equilibrium profits
We denote σ = s 2 /s 1 the quality ratio that measures the toughness of competition. It is worthwhile to note that in this setup the tariff does not a have direct impact on relative prices since p 2 /p 1 = s 2 /(2s 1 ) = σ/2. Moreover, when σ ∈ (0, 1), an increase in σ intensifies price competition leading to the Bertrand paradox in the limiting case when σ = 1. Therefore, there is an important indirect effect of trade policy since, as we will see, the anticipation of tariffs does affect the equilibrium choice of qualities, s 1 and s 2 , and hence quality ratio σ.
A necessary condition for prices (5) to form an equilibrium is 0 ≤ θ * 20 ≤ θ * 12 ≤ 1. The inequality θ * 12 ≤ 1 is equivalent to t ≤ 2s 1 (s 1 − s 2 )/(2s 1 − s 2 ), implying that the optimal tariff has to be lower than s 1 . If the last condition does not hold, the tariff is so high that Firm 1's market share cannot be positive. In this case, Firm 2 is the only firm in the market, and the only viable market structure is a domestic monopoly (see Remark 2). On the other hand, if the last condition holds with equality, Firm 1's gross profit is exactly zero resulting (in the absence of fixed costs) in the market structure called a constrained domestic monopoly. That is, Firm 1 is indifferent between being active and not active in the market, but its presence still influences Firm 2's decision. The inequalities 0 ≤ θ imposed.
The explicit solution of the price competition equilibrium also offers interesting insights about comparative statics with respect to the import tariff t. One can easily see that both firms' equilibrium prices are increasing in t. Intuitively, Firm 1's price is higher since it compensates for losses caused by a higher tariff. Due to strategic complementarity, Firm 2 is also willing to raise its price, leading to an equilibrium with higher prices. On the other hand, note that Firm 1's price net of tariff, that is p 1 − t, is decreasing in t, which reflects the standard impact of tariffs to improve the terms of trade of the domestic country. Due to higher prices, the measure of consumers served in equilibrium (that is, the size of the market, which is 1 − θ 20 ) is decreasing in t. Despite this, the domestic firm (Firm 2) faces an increase in its demand (equal to θ 12 − θ 20 ), provided the tariff leads to duopoly (i.e., it satisfies the above conditions).
The straightforward consequences of this is that Firm 1's profit is decreasing in t, whereas Firm 2's profit is increasing in t (see also the expressions for equilibrium profits (6)). This is in line with the basic idea of strategic tariffs: shifting the profits from the foreign firm to the domestic firm.
Similarly we may proceed in the case where Firm 2 produces a higher quality, i.e., s 2 > s 1 . In this case the firms' demands are
denote the consumer who is indifferent between buying the good from Firms 2 and 1, and the consumer who is indifferent between buying the good from Firm 1 and not buying at all, respectively. The equilibrium in the last stage is given by the maximization of the profits (1), and it can be easily calculated as
This yields the indifferent consumers and the firms' equilibrium profits:
Much like before, a necessary condition for the above to form an equilibrium is 0 ≤ θ * 10 ≤ θ * 21 ≤ 1. We will not elaborate upon these conditions further since it would not provide any additional insights. However, later we check that they are satisfied by the optimal tariff.
Again, with an explicit solution of the price competition equilibrium, we are able to derive insights about comparative statics with respect to the import tariff t. One can easily observe that the effect of tariff on equilibrium prices, firms' demands, and firms' profits is the same as in the previous case. In particular, we point out that Firm 1's profit is decreasing in t, whereas Firm 2's profit is increasing in t.
Tariff choice
In the free trade (FT) regime, the domestic government takes no action in the third stage, which may be represented by tariff t = 0. The corresponding price competition equilibrium can then be obtained from (5), (6) when s 2 < s 1 , and from (7), (8) when s 2 > s 1 , by setting t = 0. Firms' continuation profits (equilibrium profits from subsequent stages) are shown in Table 2 in Appendix A.
On the other hand, under the trade policy (TP) regime, the domestic government decides on its trade policy by maximizing the domestic welfare given by (2). If the LDC firm (Firm 2) produces a lower quality, then the domestic welfare (in duopoly) can be rewritten as follows:
When choosing the tariff, the domestic government anticipates the price competition equilibrium in the last stage. Note, however, that Firm 2's fixed cost C 2 is sunk at this stage. Thus, it does not influence the domestic government's maximization problem, and it may be treated as a constant. In the equilibrium with prices given by (5), the domestic social welfare is
Obviously, the domestic welfare is concave in tariffs and attains its maximum for
which consequently represents the tariff chosen by the domestic country in the subgame perfect equilibrium. It can be easily verified that under this tariff, duopoly is the equilibrium market structure (i.e., inequalities 0 ≤ θ * 20 ≤ θ * 12 ≤ 1 hold). In addition, the comparison of the welfare for tariff t * with welfare under other market structures (namely domestic and foreign monopoly as discussed in Remark 2) shows that duopoly is the equilibrium market structure, and tariff t * is optimal.
Note that the optimal tariff is increasing in s 1 and decreasing in s 2 . 23 Moreover, the optimal tariff is always positive. Thus, in the absence of a credible commitment mechanism, the domestic LDC country never prefers ex-post (after the qualities have been chosen) free trade over trade policy. Consequently, Firm 1's profit is lower and Firm 2's profit is higher than their respective profits in the free trade equilibrium when t = 0 (according to the comparative statics results from the previous section). If the LDC firm produces a higher quality, by the same procedure as in the previous case, we obtain DW = s 1 θ 21 θ 10 θ dθ + s 2 1 θ 21 θ dθ − Π 1 − C 2 , and in equilibrium
Again, the domestic welfare is concave in tariffs and attains its maximum for
It can be easily verified that for such a tariff, duopoly is the equilibrium market structure (i.e., inequalities 0 ≤ θ * 10 ≤ θ *
≤ 1 hold).
24 Again, a comparison of the welfare for tariff t * with the welfare under other domestic and foreign monopoly shows that duopoly is the equilibrium market structure, and tariff t * is optimal.
Likewise as in the previous case, the optimal tariff is positive and again without a possibility of credible commitment, the domestic country prefers ex-post trade policy over free trade. Moreover, by the same argument as above, Firm 1's profit is lower and Firm 2's profit is higher than their respective profits in the free trade equilibrium. Table 2 in Appendix A summarizes the results and shows firms' continuation profits under the optimal tariff. Note that the profits are continuous (and equal to zero) when s 1 = s 2 . In further analysis, we shall use only those continuation profits, and hence, we omit the stars denoting equilibrium. Moreover, since most of the results hold generally for both regimes, we shall use in most cases a general notation without specifying the regime. Sometimes, when convenient, we add superscript FT for the free trade regime and superscript TP for the trade policy regime.
Quality choices
In the previous sections, we have specified the equilibrium of the price competition in the last stage and the optimal tariffs chosen by the domestic country in the third stage. Table 2 (in Appendix A). We will refer to this reduced game as the quality choice game. Since all continuation profits Π i (s 1 , s 2 ) are homogeneous of degree 1 (see Table 2 ) and all cost functions are homogeneous of degree 2 in (s 1 , s 2 ), we may simplify the computations if we use explicitly the variable σ = s 2 /s 1 (quality ratio) and denote q = γ 2 s 1 . Then
where
Due to the sequential structure of decisions and the fact that q does not depend on s 2 , we may consider q as Firm 1's decision variable and σ as Firm 2's decision variable, with interval [0, ∞) as the set of available strategies for both firms. The new notation also reduces the parameter space by one dimension. Instead of γ 1 , γ 2 , and µ, all strategic decisions (i.e., firms' equilibrium choices of q and σ) will depend only on α and µ (recall that α = γ 1 /γ 2 ). Parameter γ 2 is just a multiplicative factor that can be omitted from future considerations. Equivalently, we may without loss of generality use the normalization γ 2 = 1.
Remark 3. As mentioned earlier (Footnote 1), the model can be easily adjusted to consider consumers uniformly distributed on interval [0, θ] . Indeed, if we normalize the new variables π 1 , π 2 , and q by factor 1/θ (e.g., we define q = γ 2 s 1 /θ), the results obtained in the following chapters do not change.
Follower's maximization problem
In the second stage, the follower (Firm 2) maximizes its net profit anticipating the price competition equilibrium and domestic government's tariff choice. The net profit is the difference between the firm's gross profit (revenue) and costs of achieving a certain quality, i.e., Π 2 (s 1 , s 2 ) − C 2 (s 1 , s 2 ). Under the new notation, the follower's maximization problem is equivalent to max The exact expressions for π 2 (σ) and c 2 (σ) can be found in Table 2 in Appendix A. Note that both π 2 (σ) and c 2 (σ) are continuous, but have a kink in σ = 1. Moreover, both have a continuous second derivative (are C 2 ) on intervals [0, 1) and (1, ∞). Observe also that Firm 2's optimization problem (12) and hence its solution too do not depend on α.
Thus, all results presented in this section hold uniformly for all α ∈ (0, 1]. Firm 2's profit π 2 (σ) − qc 2 (σ) attains its maximum, which is always interior, i.e., σ / ∈ {0, 1} (see Lemma 1 in Supplementary Appendix B for the proof). Thus, the optimal choice of σ, let us denote it σ * (q), satisfies the first order condition
The expressions for the first derivative of Firm 2's gross profit can be found in Table 2 (in Appendix A) and are illustrated in Figure 1 . Let σ 1 (q) be the solution of the first-order condition (13) on interval (0, 1) and σ 2 (q) the solution on interval (1, ∞), if it exists.
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As shown in Lemma 2 (in Supplementary Appendix B), solution σ 1 (q) always exists and is unique, whereas solution σ 2 (q) exists (in which case it is unique) if and only if q <q,
in the FT regime andq TP = 1 in the TP regime. In the case q ≥q, Firm 1's quality is sufficiently high, so that Firm 2 chooses a lower quality, i.e., σ * (q) = σ 1 (q).
On the other hand, if q <q, we have two candidates for Firm 2's optimal decision: σ 1 (q) and σ 2 (q). In order to find its best response, we need to compare its net profits from choosing σ 1 (q) and σ 2 (q).
25 With superscripts 1 and 2, we distinguish between the solutions from interval (0, 1), where Firm 1 produces a higher quality, and from interval (1, ∞), where Firm 2 produces a higher quality. In addition, for the purposes of comparative statics, we will use µ as subscript, e.g., we write σ 
In addition, Firm 2's best response σ * (q) is decreasing in q.
See Supplementary Appendix B for the proof and Figure 2 for illustration. According to Proposition 1, Firm 2 chooses a higher quality when q is below the thresholdq and a lower quality when q is above the threshold. Note that the value ofq depends only on the degree of imitation µ. However, the values ofq in the FT regime and the TP regime may be different.
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Note that since σ * (q) is decreasing in q, we have a situation of strategic substitutes.
More precisely, Proposition 1 shows that if Firm 1 chooses its quality s 1 sufficiently low (i.e., q = γ 2 s 1 is sufficiently low), then Firm 2 chooses a higher quality s 2 > s 1 (i.e., σ * (q) > 1). If, on the other hand, Firm 1 chooses its quality s 1 sufficiently high (i.e., q is high), then Firm 2 chooses a lower quality s 2 < s 1 (i.e., σ * (q) < 1). Intuitively, by choosing a low quality, Firm 1 leaves enough space for Firm 2, which consequently finds it profitable to choose a higher quality. Conversely, when Firm 1 chooses a high quality, Firm 2 will find a higher quality not profitable and will consequently choose a lower quality. The value of the thresholdq µ can be found by solving the following system of three 26 Following Footnote 25 we will capture the dependence on µ using subscript µ (i.e.,q µ ). In addition, we also denoteq FT andq TP the values ofq in the FT and the TP regimes, respectively.
equations:
with unknowns q, σ 1 , σ 2 , where σ 1 < 1 < σ 2 . The first two equations represent the first-order conditions for σ 1 < 1 and σ 2 > 1, respectively. Recall that the expressions for π 2 (σ) and also c 2 (σ) are these cases. The third equation represents the equality of net profits, i.e., Firm 2 is indifferent between choosing a higher quality σ 2 and a lower quality
Unfortunately, it is not possible to solve the above system explicitly in terms of µ. However, we may still derive certain properties of the solution, and for any µ ∈ [0, 1] we may solve the system numerically. The following propositions provide some comparative statics results with respect to the degree of imitation or technological spillovers µ (see Supplementary Appendix B for their proofs).
Proposition 2. For any fixed q, the following statements hold (i) Follower's best response σ * µ (q) is non-decreasing in the degree of imitation µ. More specifically, σ 1 µ (q) is increasing in µ, σ 2 µ (q) does not depend on µ, and the threshold q µ is increasing in µ.
(ii) If q / ∈ {0,q µ }, the follower's optimal net profit π 2 (σ * µ (q)) − qc 2 (σ * µ (q)) is increasing in the degree of imitation µ.
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The second statement suggests that imitation raises the follower's profit. Based on the Envelope Theorem argument, this effect is driven by the reduction of fixed costs due to imitation (see the proof in the Supplementary Appendix). The first statement suggests that imitation has also a positive effect on the follower's quality when it is lower than the leader's one. On the other hand, imitation has no effect on the follower's quality choice when it exceeds the leader's quality. This result follows from the fact that technological spillovers do not affect the follower's marginal costs when it chooses a higher quality. Finally, when µ increases, a larger q is necessary to make Firm 2 indifferent between choosing σ 1 (q) and σ 2 (q). The reason is that σ 1 (q) increases in µ, and so a largerq is necessary to make Firm 2 indifferent between choosing a higher and a lower quality. The profile ofq µ is depicted in Figure 3 (obtained numerically). The figure also shows that
27 Recall that c 2 (σ) depends on µ as well. Now, quality reversal occurs when Firm 2 chooses a lower quality in the free trade regime (that is, q >q FT µ holds), but by virtue of trade policy Firm 1's optimal choice is pushed to the "lower" quality levels (that is, q <q TP µ ). Note, however, that q is Firm 1's strategic choice and its equilibrium value may be in general different in the FT and the TP regimes. The intuition behind quality reversal lies in the fact that the optimal tariff is increasing in Firm's 1 quality (see Footnote 23), and so anticipating this, the equilibrium strategy of Firm 1 is to downgrade its quality. Thus, the optimal quality of Firm 1 in the trade policy regime may fall into the critical region of q, (that is, q <q TP µ ) so that the optimal response for Firm 2 is to jump up the quality ladder. In the following section, we analyze Firm 1's choice of q in both regimes and identify the values of the parameters where quality reversal occurs.
Leader's maximization problem
In this section, we analyze the leader's quality choice in the first stage. Anticipating the follower's best response and equilibrium in further stages, the leader (Firm 1) maximizes its net profit Π 1 (s 1 , s 2 ) − C 1 (s 1 ), subject to Firm 2's best response. This problem can be rewritten in an equivalent form:
with σ * (q) given by (14). As Firm 2's best response has a jump in q =q µ , Firm 1's net profit has a jump in this point as well. Furthermore, the best response is continuous on both intervals [0,q µ ) and (q µ , ∞). Lemma 4 in the Supplementary Appendix shows that the leader's profit qπ 1 (σ * (q)) − 1 2 αq 2 attains its maximum and that the optimal value of q is positive.
Since it is not possible to find the follower's best response explicitly, we are also not able to find a closed form solution to the leader's problem.
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However, we may derive some comparative statics results, provided in the following proposition, and solve the problem numerically. We use the subscript µ to highlight the dependence of q * µ on µ. Note that then σ * µ (q * µ ) is Firm 2's equilibrium choice of σ and
2 is the leader's equilibrium profit.
Proposition 3. For any α ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1], the following statements hold:
(i) The leader's equilibrium profit is decreasing in the degree of imitation µ when the leader produces a higher quality in equilibrium (i.e., when q * µ >q µ ).
(ii) If the leader produces a higher quality in equilibrium, then the leader's strategy q µ is decreasing in the spillovers parameter µ under FT for all α and µ and also under TP as soon as α surpasses a certain small threshold. 29 This threshold is decreasing in µ.
(iii) The leader's equilibrium profit as well as both firms' equilibrium strategies q * µ and σ * µ (q * µ ) do not depend on the degree of imitation µ when the leader produces a lower quality in equilibrium (i.e., when q * µ <q µ ).
(iv) The leader's equilibrium profit is decreasing in the relative efficiency α for all q * / ∈ {0,q}.
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in Supplementary Appendix B. The first part of the proposition conforms to our intuition that imitation has a positive effect on the follower (see Proposition 2), but negative effect on the leader, provided that the follower opts for a lower quality. On the other hand, if the follower opts for a higher quality, then the equilibrium strategies (and also the leader's profit) do not depend on the degree of imitation. This, together with part (i) of Proposition 2, directly implies the corollary.
28 A potential way of solving the leader's optimization problem would be to express q as a function of σ from the follower's best response, as q = π 2 (σ)/c 2 (σ), and to maximize the leader's profit with respect to σ. This approach however involves two drawbacks. First, it is still not possible to solve for the thresholdq that determines the form of the function σ * (q). Second, the first order conditions after the above substitution involve higher-order polynomials. See the proof of Proposition 3, part (ii) for more details.
29 More precisely, the threshold can be evaluated as 0.0649(1−µ). For α smaller than this threshold, the disincentive effect of µ on the Firm 1's equilibrium quality choice disappears due to the huge difference in efficiency in generating quality.
Note, however, that although the equilibrium strategies do not depend on µ, the follower's profit does; it is linear and increasing in µ (see Table 2 ). The last part of the proposition claims, consistently with intuition, that an increase in the gap between the developed foreign country and the less developed domestic country, benefits the foreign leader.
So the very presence of spillovers (on the top of tariffs) affects adversely the high quality of the DC firm implying that the quality it chooses on its home market is, ceteris paribus, likely to be higher than the one on the LDC market. This is consistent with the recent empirical observations demonstrating that the DC firms set a lower quality for their product in the LDC markets than on their home or DC markets (see Fontagné, Gaulier, and Zignago 2008; Manova and Zhang 2012) .
In order to find the equilibrium choices of qualities, we used numerical simulations.
30
Our main findings from the simulations are summarized in the two results below. 31 The first one presents the result for the free-trade regime.
Result 1. For all α ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1], Firm 1 chooses a higher quality in the free-trade regime equilibrium.
Remark 4. Result 1 complements the results by Aoki and Prusa (1997) and LehmannGrube (1997). As we already mentioned, both papers analyze sequential choice of qualities with firms having identical cost structure (in a general form). They show that the leader always chooses a higher quality. In our setting this corresponds to the case µ = 0 and α = 1. However, their methods of proofs rely on symmetry and independence of cost functions and cannot be modified to capture technological spillovers, where Firm 1's quality choice also directly affects Firm 2's costs.
Consider first the free trade regime in the benchmark case without imitation and when the firms are symmetric in terms of marginal investments efficiencies (i.e., α = 1 and µ = 0). In this case, we find that Firm 1, which has a first-mover advantage, produces a higher quality in equilibrium. Clearly, this result is reinforced when α decreases, since a lower value of α benefits Firm 1 even more by providing it a cost advantage over Firm 2; see also Proposition 3, part (iv). More interestingly, allowing for imitation (µ > 0) does not change the result qualitatively.
30 The need to use numerical simulations arises for two reasons. First, due to the multi-period structure, the subgame-perfect equilibrium involves a sequence of maximization problems that need to be solved and that in turn makes the problem rather complex. Second, due to the property of equilibrium with vertically differentiated products, the maximization problems of finding quality choices (and that is the last sequence to be solved) have as an outcome higher-order polynomials that preclude the analytical solutions of the first-order conditions. The simulations were performed using Mathematica 5.0 software. We used a grid of 100 × 100 in the (α, µ)-space. For each point (α, µ) from the grid, we verified whether the property holds or not. The program code can be obtained from the authors upon request.
31 As a byproduct of the simulations, we find that at the point of discontinuityq µ , Firm 1's net profit jumps upwards. Since Firm 2 is indifferent between choosing qualities σ 1 (q) and σ 2 (q) when q =q µ , only the former can be chosen in equilibrium (recall that we analyze pure strategy equilibria). An increase in the intensity of imitation µ has a similar effect as an increase in α (i.e., a negative effect on Firm 1, but a positive effect on Firm 2) and that would in a setup without leadership result, after a certain threshold in relative efficiency is surpassed, in Firm 2 producing a variety of a higher quality.
32 However, the very existence of the leader reverts this, showing the value of the first-mover advantage in this setup. Having established that Firm 2 always chooses a lower quality in the free trade equilibrium, consider now the trade policy equilibrium. As we already indicated, the trade policy in this setup has a potentially conspicuous effect that may deprive Firm 1 of its leadership position and lead to quality reversal. In order to identify the conditions under which quality reversal occurs, it is sufficient to find out when Firm 2 chooses a higher quality in equilibrium. The following result characterizes the set of parameters that lead to quality reversal.
Result 2. For any µ ∈ [0, 1], there is a critical valueα µ ∈ (0, 1) such that quality reversal occurs if and only if α >α µ . In addition, the critical valueα µ is decreasing in the degree of imitation µ. Figure 4 shows the values ofα µ and the region where quality reversal occurs.
33 As a striking result, we obtain that quality reversal occurs when the firms are symmetric in terms of investment efficiencies, irrespective of imitation. Namely, we find that quality reversal occurs for the benchmark case µ = 0 and α = 1. The intuition behind these results stems from the sequencing of moves. If Firm 1 chooses a high quality, it incurs 32 Note that in such a setup, but in the absence of leadership, there are two equilibria since each firm can a priori choose either a higher or a lower quality. Thus, the introduction of leadership in the standard ex-ante symmetric setup helps to establish the uniqueness of equilibrium.
33 Based on a rough approximation of the critical valueα µ (using the same method as above; see Footnote 30), we used further numerical computations in order to evaluate it more precisely. In particular, for each value of µ from the grid (of size 100 on interval [0, 1]), we computed the value of α using the bisector method with absolute error less than 10 −6 . significant costs, that are sunk in later stages. This allows other players who move later, namely Firm 2 and the domestic government, to extract additional revenue. In particular, the domestic government may extract tariff revenues by imposing a high tariff (recall that the optimal tariff is increasing in s 1 when s 1 > s 2 ). This decreases the leader's net profits and may eliminate its first-mover advantage. The leader may, therefore, rather decide to choose a low quality, allowing for quality reversal. Consequently, quality reversal also occurs for all higher values of µ (Corollary 1).
On the other hand, lower values of α benefit Firm 1. In the extreme case where α is close to zero, we find that Firm 2 always chooses a lower quality, irrespective of the degree of imitation µ. In between, for any fixed µ, there is a critical value of α (denoted α µ ) such that quality reversal occurs if and only if α exceeds this critical value, i.e., the firms are close enough to be symmetric. In addition (see Result 2), the critical valueα µ decreases when µ increases, reflecting the fact that quality reversal is more likely when imitation is easier (high values of µ). Intuitively it follows from the fact that both an increase in µ and an increase in α have similar effects -they benefit the domestic firm on the expense of the foreign firm. Rodrik (2001) argues that trade liberalization is an outcome of, rather than a precondition for, successful economic development. Our analysis, on the other hand, indicates that the relation between economic development and trade liberalization is non-monotonic. Thus, free trade is optimal at lower levels of development up to the point where the technological gap is reduced sufficiently (up toα µ in our case; see Figure 4 ). For higher values of α, strategic trade and other import substitution policies may be invoked in order to induce policy reversal. When (and if) the technological gap would be fully eliminated by means of economic development supported by the appropriate set of policies, the need for trade policy ceases to exist and free trade can again be a desirable option.
Remark 5. Result 2 complements the results by Herguera et al. (2002, Proposition 1) , who consider the firms to be symmetric and show that under the optimal trade policy the foreign firm always produces a low-quality good in equilibrium. In our setting this corresponds to the special (benchmark) case when α = 1 and µ = 0. However, our results and intuition suggest that when relaxing symmetry (by taking decreasing α), trade policy may not be sufficient to force the foreign firm to choose a lower quality.
Remark 6. In this paper we solely focus on ex-post tariffs. As noted in the introduction, the likely absence of commitment power of the LDC government makes ex-ante tariffs time inconsistent and, therefore, not very realistic. As it is well known in the strategic trade literature, when tariffs are chosen before firms' strategic decisions, trade policy becomes superior to free trade. Moreover, it might also be optimal for a government to set a prohibitive tariff that makes the domestic firm a monopoly (see Brander 1995) . Within our framework, this would occur when the relative difference in efficiency between the firms is not "too large"; in such a case the optimal ex-ante tariff induces a domestic monopoly rather than quality reversal. However, for most parameter values, a duopoly with the DC firm producing a higher quality turns out to be the equilibrium market structure.
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Comparison of FT and TP equilibrium
In this section, we compare the domestic welfare in the free trade equilibrium with the welfare in the trade policy equilibrium. As it is not possible to characterize these equilibria explicitly, we obtain our results using numerical simulations. We first compare the firms' profits in both regimes and then look at the key determinants of the consumer surplus: average quality, total market size, and its redistribution caused by trade policy. The results for domestic welfare are illustrated in Figure 5 . Additional comparisons are summarized in Table 1 in Appendix A. We provide an extended discussion as well as illustration of these comparisons in Supplementary Appendix C and Figures E.2-E.8.
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Firms' profits. As expected, Firm 1's profit is harmed in the TP regime due to profit shifting. More precisely, Firm 1 earns lower profit (both net and gross) in the TP equilibrium than in the FT equilibrium, for all α ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1]. On the other hand, this relationship is generally reversed for Firm 2. Its profit (both net and gross) in the FT equilibrium is almost always lower than the (corresponding) profit in the TP equilibrium.
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Market size and average quality. In a dominant part of the parameter space, the optimal trade policy reduces the market size (or aggregate demand).
37 The comparison of the market size provides first intuition on the effects on consumers. It, however, does not take into account the product qualities and, therefore, consumers' utilities. A complementary intuition can be provided by comparing the average quality weighted by 34 The analysis under ex-ante tariffs is technically much more complex due to different market structures that could potentially occur in equilibrium. Again, as the profit functions involve higher-order polynomials, the equilibrium can be only found numerically. Our numerical simulations indicate that the LDC government indeed tends to choose a prohibitive tariff that induces domestic monopoly when the market conditions favor the domestic firm (large α and µ). On the other hand, duopoly occurs for most combinations of µ and α. Finally, it is also possible to find pairs of α and µ for which quality reversal occurs (very large µ and very low α).
35 Available on Eugen Kovac's homepage and from the authors upon request. 36 In both cases, an exception is a small region with area approximately 1% of the whole feasible region of parameters, when α is small and µ is large. The corresponding figures can be found in the Supplementary Appendix (Figures E.3 and E.4) .
37 An exception is a small region where no quality reversal occurs (with area approximately 7%, as shown in Figure E .2 in the Supplementary Appendix).
the market shares. The simulations suggest that the optimal trade policy always reduces the average quality.
Welfare. The effect of trade policy on the consumer surplus may be decomposed into effects on market size (since only consumers who purchase some good obtain a positive utility) and the effect on quality (which determines each consumer's utility). Due to the reduction of the market size and average quality, we might expect that trade policy also tends to reduce the consumer surplus. The simulations indeed confirm this intuition. The optimal trade policy, therefore, benefits only the domestic firm but not the consumers. The change in the domestic welfare then depends on the balance of these two effects and, in addition, on the size of the tariff revenue (which is zero in the FT equilibrium and positive in the TP equilibrium). The simulations show that the optimal trade policy reduces the domestic welfare compared to the FT regime when firms are asymmetric enough (α is small) but increases the domestic welfare when firms are close to being symmetric (α is close to 1) and technological spillovers are not strong (µ is not too large); see Figure 5 .
38 In other words, the considered trade policy is socially beneficial only after the country has reached a certain relative threshold level of economic development (captured by α) and spillovers are not too large (which may also imply that there is a certain level of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection). Figure 5 also indicates that there is a close relation between quality reversal and welfare improvements, as summarized in the following result.
Result 3. Under the optimal trade policy quality reversal is a necessary but not sufficient condition for improvement in domestic welfare (compared to free trade).
The intuition that trade policy might be socially preferable for the domestic country to free trade when the domestic firm produces a higher quality seems apparent (since improvement in domestic gross profit is tremendous and there is a tariff gain in addition). However, the fact that free trade may yield a higher domestic welfare when µ is large enough even when trade policy leads to quality reversal (as indicated in Figure 5 ) is somewhat less obvious. To explain this, first recall that the consumer surplus is always higher in the FT regime than in the TP regime. Moreover, an increase in imitation in the FT regime makes price competition tougher (σ increases) and the size of the market larger (the number of consumers served in equilibrium rises with µ), which in principle 38 Note that the boundary of the region where free trade yields a higher domestic welfare has a kink for µ ≈ 0.84 and α ≈ 0.82. When α increases, the boundary value of µ lies in the interval (0.84, 0.85); simulations with a finer grid indicate that it is in fact downward-sloping. The kink arises due to corner solutions in which it is optimal for Firm 1 to choose q * =q µ (in the FT regime), making Firm 2 indifferent between a higher and a lower quality (see also Footnote 31). The simulations show that this occurs when both µ and α are sufficiently large. More details can be found in the Supplementary Appendix C.
benefits domestic consumers.
39 At the same time, the size of the consumer surplus is obviously not affected by the change in the imitation parameter µ when there is trade induced quality reversal; see part (iii) of Proposition 3. Last but not the least, the sunk costs of imitation in the FT regime fall much faster with µ than in the TP regime with quality reversal, approaching zero for µ tending to 1. (Note that these costs are for any µ substantially lower in the FT regime than in the TP regime since the domestic firm produces a lower quality under free trade.) This, in turn, rapidly decreases the difference in the corresponding net profits of the domestic firm in the FT and the TP regime, respectively. Thus, given the above effects, there is for any given value of α a critical value of µ beyond which the domestic welfare in the FT regime dominates its counterpart in the TP regime even in the case when trade policy leads to quality reversal.
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The policy implications of the above discussion indicate that the LDC government may wish to commit to free trade and, to the extent that spillovers are positively correlated with IPR violation, strengthen its IPR rights in the cases where the gap in its relative economic development is substantial and where trade in vertically differentiated products prevails in its trade account. This commitment can be induced, for example, by joining a trade organization or signing a bilateral trade agreement.
Finally, it may seem that Result 3 suggests that the very appearance of tariffs and trade policy in the LDC indicates that in its background there was quality reversal (or an attempt of it). In real life, however, we frequently observe tariffs without quality reversals. This might happen in cases when there are other motives for tariffs than inducing quality reversal. Recall that we examine the situation when competition in qualities drives firms' strategic behavior. Obviously, occurrence of quality reversal is closely correlated to such form of competition. If competition takes place along other dimensions (e.g., under horizontal differentiation), quality reversal is not an issue, so the appearance of tariffs is not related to it. Even when there is quality competition but the LDC government cannot commit to free trade, it will always find it optimal to set tariffs irrespective of whether the optimal tariff would induce quality reversal or not. On 39 Note that FT dominates TP "excessively" for large values of parameters µ and α (right upper corner of Figure 5 ). In this region, there is a "corner solution," as described in Footnotes 31 and 38. Unlike in standard cases where optimal q comes from the "interior" set (i.e., when q * µ >q µ ), Firm 1's optimal quality q * µ is now increasing in µ, as it is equal toq µ , which we know to be increasing in µ (see Proposition 2 and Figure 3) . That, in turn, enables Firm 1 to be better off by choosing a higher quality. This phenomenon leads to an even stronger increase in the consumer surplus in µ compared to the values of µ that do not yield a "corner solution." It also explains the shape of that region (see also Supplementary Appendix D). 40 The phenomenon that strategic trade policy may yield a lower domestic welfare than free trade when the government cannot commit to ex-ante instruments has been observed in a rather different context of standard models with horizontal product differentiation or with homogenous goods where the action takes place in a third market (that is, the domestic welfare coincides with the domestic firm profit net of subsidies; see for instance, Karp and Perloff 1995; Neary and O'Sullivan 1999; Grossman and Maggi 1998; and Neary and Leahy 2000) . The intuition for this result lies in manipulative strategic overinvestment by the domestic firm. the other hand, if the LDC government can somehow commit to ex-ante tariffs, again tariffs will always be optimal without necessarily inducing quality reversal. Last but not the least, the LDC government might have objectives other than maximizing domestic welfare. For instance, tariffs may be set in a need of revenue or with the intention of protecting domestic producers and avoiding loss of jobs. Such tariffs are again not related to quality reversal.
Conclusion
The competition between the DC and LDC firms displays the characteristic of vertical product differentiation with the two distinct features: (i) DC firms tend to act as quality leaders while the LDC firms act as followers, and (ii) LDC firms have a tendency to imitate the products or technology from the firms from the developed countries. Firms' choices of qualities are endogenous and may be influenced by some governmental policies. Thus, the attention of strategic trade policy literature has recently shifted towards international markets in vertically differentiated goods. It, however, has neglected the above two features of quality leadership and imitation and spillovers. Our paper aims to fill this gap by introducing leadership and spillovers into the vertical differentiation model of international trade on the LDC market. In this setup, we analyze a time consistent strategic trade policy that appears in a simple and the most common form of import tariff. This is particularly important since the striking effect of trade policy (or, more precisely, its anticipation) in this setup is that it can lead to quality reversal.
The importance of quality reversal, however, becomes evident once we recall our Result 3, in which we show that quality reversal is necessary for strategic trade policy to dominate free trade in terms of social welfare. In this respect, our analysis might have also shed some light on the commonly known East Asian "economic miracles" briefly discussed in the introduction. We also stress the role of technological spillovers or imitation in narrowing the technological gap that occurs via increasing LDC firm efficiency in generating quality (reducing γ 2 to (1 − µ)γ 2 ) and via the ability of the LDC firm to generate a particular product quality. In fact, spillovers enable the domestic firm (with or without import tariffs) to enter the relevant market and compete with the DC competitor. The underlying idea is that the imitation parameter µ captures a complex process of transferring capabilities from the developed world to the LDC firm. As it is argued in the capabilities literature (see for instance, Richard R. Nelson 1982; Sutton 2005) , the key notion is that in most industries the carrier of capability is a set of pieces of "tacit knowledge" that cannot be codified compared to the knowledge that could be embodied in blueprints. Thus, the transfer of capabilities is inherently difficult and complex. The medium or the drivers that we stressed here and that are able to transfer this tacit knowledge and reduce the technological gap are (i) prior trading experience with the DC firms and (ii) on-the-job training at some DC agent or firm. In terms of our model, it would imply that LDC firm's acquired capabilities through these processes that map into "revealed capabilities" (captured here by (1 − µ)γ 2 and s 2 ). However, as we argued in the introduction, the technological drivers that transfer tacit knowledge and reduce the gap occur also through various forms of FDI presence as well as activities like outsourcing, import of inputs from the DC, foreign acquisitions of firms from the LDC, etc. (see for instance, Sutton 2005 for a description of the very mechanism underlying the capability transfer via FDI; see also Morita and Nguyen 2011) . Finally, when the technological gap is substantially narrowed or overcome by all these channels described above, the main drivers of the capability building becomes the firm's own investment in R&D and the relevant knowledge creation, as the example of the successful South East Asia economies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc.) amply demonstrates (see World Bank 1993) .
As for the concrete policies that support the above transfer, besides well known polices to attract FDI, domestic content requirement or subsidization and support of R&D, the key for the successful transfer of tacit knowledge seems to lie in establishing an institutional framework. This framework includes, among other things, the set of networks within which domestic firms, and newly born firms in particular, can have access to channels of information and training with respect to international best practice in its industries (see Sutton 2005) . Sutton (2005) argues that channels of this kind are notoriously lacking in the LDC, ". . . and one of the key levers of a well-designed industrial development policy lies in providing channels of this kind."
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Finally, our analysis points to the limitations of trade policy alone for spurring economic development and the domestic welfare of a LDC. Namely, the technological gap has to be rather small and spillovers should not be "too large" for trade policy to be effective in promoting the domestic firm into the position of the quality and market. Thus, some more fundamental policies (mentioned above) aimed at the increase of the LDC countries' human capital and technological capabilities have to be in place much before the trade policy would be invoked for the purposes of promoting domestic firms to become quality and market leaders. In other words, when the domestic government cannot induce quality reversal using trade policy (and this seems to be the most plausible outcome with the current technological gap between the DC and LDC), then it may prefer not to adopt the policy and engage in free trade. This may be achieved by a commitment to free trade. A bilateral trade agreement or a participation in a trade union can serve as mechanisms to achieve such a commitment. Therefore, our paper provides rationale for unilateral incentives to adopt free trade. 
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